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Abstract
This dissertation comprises three chapters on the Chinese cigarettes industry.
The China State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA) regulates this indus-
try, allocating quotas of production across manufacturers. Between 2006 and 2007,
it mandated all cigarette firms within a province merge into a single state-owned,
province-level firm. After the merger, the province-level firms allocate their quotas
for the maximum number of cartons they can produce directly.
In the first chapter, I examine how the mandated change in market structure
resulting from the STMA affected allocation on the quality dimension. To assess
the pre-merger differences in market structure in quota allocation, I compare the
changes in cigarette quality in provinces that initially had only one firm, hence whose
market structure did not change, with those that initially had multiple firms. I
construct a theoretical model for the monopoly market and the duopoly market. The
model predicts that when there is regional competition, the proportion of high-quality
cigarettes is lower than in a monopoly market. I use an event study method and a
triple-differences model to identify the changes in the quality composition at the
province-level before and after the merger by comparing two types of reorganization.
I find that the consolidation mandated by the merger is associated with increases in
product quality. I use the incentives of managers in monopoly and oligopoly markets
to explain the shift in quality choices of firms in the provinces affected by the STMA
mandate.
My second paper presents the analysis of the effect of the mandated merger
on inventory. The Chinese cigarette industry provides an excellent opportunity to
study a market with the characteristics of inflexible prices and uncertain demand.
In this paper, I provide a theoretical model to take into account the demand uncer-
ii
tainty and different market structures to predict how the mandated consolidation
as an exogenous shock affects the inventory. Based on the theoretical model, if
there are competitors in the region, which is a duopoly market, managers choose
non-cooperative strategies by producing more high-quality cigarettes to steal their
competitors’ high-segment markets for higher profit margins, which leads to higher
inventories. My empirical analysis confirms these effects for high-quality cigarettes
and medium-quality cigarettes.
My third chapter presents the welfare analysis of the effect of horizontal merg-
ers. Based on the theoretical model in Chapter One, after the reform, the consumers
who can buy the cigarettes with desired characteristics increases. The consumer’s wel-
fare increases as a result of the consolidation. On the other hand, producer welfare
increases because of the lower dollar value of the inventory.
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Chapter 1
Product Choice Under the
Restriction of Quota: Horizontal
Mergers in China’s Cigarette
Industry
1.1 Introduction
Since Coase (1937) first addressed the classic issue of “make versus buy,”
economists have devoted efforts to understand what determines the boundaries of
a firm. Holmstrom (1999) suggests that we should consider the internal structure
of firms and the operation of markets together so that we can analyze how they
interact as organizations. There are three significant types of organization in China,
private, mixed, and state-owned. The Chinese cigarette industry is entirely owned by
the state, as are most of the country’s key manufacturing industries. As Figure 1.1
shows, the tax revenue from this industry increased from 1.165 billion RMB in 2002
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to approximately six billion RMB by 2012, accounting for approximately 8% of the
total government tax revenue.
In this paper, we investigate how a mandated consolidation of government-
owned cigarette producers affected the mix of cigarette types on the market. The
State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA) determines quotas for each manu-
facturer, i. e., the maximum number of cigarettes it can produce. While the manufac-
turers can produce as much of the quotas as they are able to fill, they cannot change
the allocation prices, i. e., the price of the cigarettes they sell the cigarettes back
to the STMA. Within this structure, the manager decide how to allocate the quotas
among the different quality levels of cigarettes. 1 Since the maximum quantity of
cigarettes and the allocation prices are fixed, the decision on quota-allocation is the
only competition strategy the managers have open to them. This study focuses on
the change of quota allocation resulting from the mandated merger.
We begin by describing the reform that led to the consolidation, the nature of
cigarette production in China, the incentives for the managers, and how the reform
changed the structure of the industry. As a significant part of the major reform
of China’s state-owned enterprises begun in the late 1990s, the large tobacco firms
merged into large industrial conglomerates. The reform reduced the total number
of manufacturers in these enterprises from 44 in the year 2005 to 27 by the year
2009, primarily by consolidating firms within a province to a single operation, or a
monopoly operator. This mandated organizational consolidation changed the market
structure and competitive situation within the region.
We then introduce the incentives for the managers in the Chinese cigarette
industry. Many studies have investigated how contracts provide incentives for man-
1The STMA established classification criteria based on the allocation prices to categorize
cigarettes: higher allocation prices mean better raw materials or filters and, thus, represent higher
quality levels of cigarettes.
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agers. For example, Besley and Ghatak (2005) explored competition and incentives in
mission-oriented production, finding the payoff from the success of the principal must
be high enough to offset agency costs due to the moral hazard to ensure both par-
ties receive non-negative payoffs. Managers of state-owned enterprises are faced with
managerial tasks delegated by the government or its representative bureaus (Choe and
Yin, 2000). Thus, managers involved in the manufacture of cigarette need to fulfill
their targets so as to use all of the quotas, minimize the inventory, and maximize the
profit. As the allocation prices of the cigarettes they produce are set by the STMA,
based on production costs, high-quality cigarettes have higher profit margins than
low-quality cigarettes. Thus, the managers make decisions across how to allocate the
quota across different quality levels of cigarettes to achieve the quota targets set by
the central bureau, having no discretion on price.
We then develop a theoretical model, based on Desai (2001), which focuses
on the change in the quota allocation strategies before and after the government
mandated merger. The model generates two important implications regarding or-
ganizational forms of monopoly and duopoly. We contribute to the literature by
focusing on the punishment for failing to fulfill the quota. Our model predicts that in
a duopoly market, the punishment for not fulfilling the target causes the managers to
lower the quota they allocate to high-quality goods, unlike in the monopoly scenario.
Our empirical findings are consistent with theoretical predictions. We look
at how managers change their decisions regarding quota allocation in response to
changes in organizations, both before and after the reorganization of the industry. To
identify the effect, we used an event study model and a triple-difference approach. We
found that following organization reform, the incentives for the managers changed. In
the single firm market, manufacturers allocated more of the quota for higher-quality
cigarettes than in the multiple firms market. The competitors in the various firm
3
market who are price elastic produce low-quality cigarettes to capture the customers
and consequently a larger share of the market, thus making the managers in the
state-owned enterprises fulfill their production target and minimize their inventory.
In this paper, given that the decision of quota allocation for different quality
goods is the competition strategy, we explore two questions. First, what are the
differences in the allocation decisions before and after the merger? Second, what
drives the different product quality decisions in highly regulated markets under a
quota restriction? This paper is the first to focus on quota allocation as a competitive
strategy in a highly regulated industry. These new findings are discussed in the
following sections.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the background and regulation policy of the Chinese tobacco industry including the
horizontal mergers. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 describes
the data sources, how the variables are defined and constructed, and the summary
statistics. Section 5 introduces the empirical research design. Section 6 discusses the
results, and Section 7 provides conclusions.
1.2 Industrial Background
We begin by introducing the institutional mechanics of state-owned enter-
prises. We then summarize the regulation strategies of cigarettes in China, and
finally, we describe the reorganization of the Chinese cigarette industry.
1.2.1 State-Owned Enterprises
Based on the different types of ownership, the organization of enterprises can
be categorized as private, mixed, and state-owned enterprises, with past research
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focused on comparing them. For example, Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) investigated
how a firm’s productivity is affected by its market structure and various ownership
or control rights, while Boardman and Vining (1989) compared the performance of
private, mixed, and state-owned enterprises by using the property rights theory of
firms, and Che and Qian (1998) suggest that state-owned enterprises play a significant
role in the natural monopoly and regulated duopoly market because of the lack of
secure property rights. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) under national government
control are the predominant type of ownership in China, including such key industries
as banking, telecommunications, energy, rail transportation, civil aviation, tobacco,
and wholesale trade on agricultural inputs and outputs.
As the agent of the state-owned enterprises, the managers are the decision-
makers concerning quota allocation. Thus, their incentives become an essential ques-
tion: how do they choose competitive strategies when they have individual incentives
for carrying out those tasks. Groves et al. (1994) found that when the responsibility
for output decisions shift from the state to the firm and when firms are allowed to
retain more of their profits, the incentives for managers of Chinese state-owned en-
terprises are strengthened. Zhang (2006) also points out that aligning the right of
residual claim and the power of residual control requires established property rights
and the implementation of control. Sheng and Zhao (2013) advocate for addressing
the issues between the supervision and incentives of SOE managers through design-
ing internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. In the Chinese cigarette
industry, the contract set by government agencies includes the rules for profit-sharing
and residual control. In addition, these contracts for the managers in a state-owned
enterprise usually contain the target for profit and tax, output target, product cost
target, and even fulfillment of the state plan (Zhang, 2006).
The reform of the enterprises in the state sector, which began in the late 1990s,
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aimed to make the state-owned enterprises “corporatized” (Hsieh and Song, 2015). As
part of the proposed reforms, which were described as “Grasp the Large, Let Go of the
Small,” China’s tobacco industry introduced significant institution-building processes
including the consolidation of producers. As shown in Figure 1.2, the STMA reduced
the number of cigarette firms from 44 to 27, with the aim of increasing the economies
of scale, and the forced reorganization by merging all manufactures in same province
into one state-owned, province-level company that could allocate its production quota
across all of the merging factories. Such exogenous institutional forces, coupled with
the previous domestic institutional conditions, enabled a power shift from the local
authorities to the central authority.
1.2.2 Tobacco Industry Structure
1.2.2.1 The Mechanics of the Regulation
The China tobacco industry is characterized by strict governmental regulation
based on a system of vertical management and monopolized operation (Wang, 2009;
Gao, Zheng and Hu, 2012). Fang, Lee and Sejpal (2017) suggests China established
the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA) as the government’s represen-
tative bureau in 1984, which undertakes central planning, manages raw materials,
sets regional production quotas for leaves and products.
The industrial organization of the cigarette production sector is shown in Fig-
ure 1.3. Under China’s monopoly system, the State Tobacco Monopoly Adminis-
tration (STMA) determines “allocation plans” for both total production and prices
of cigarettes, distributing these production quotas to each company, with the price
in this process being referred to as the allocation price (Song Gao, 2012). Man-
agers of these tobacco companies allocate the production quotas for the various prod-
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ucts, which are classified into different grades. After the manufacturers produce the
cigarettes, they sell them back to the STMA at the allocation price, which is set
based on the production cost. The allocation prices vary based primarily on the raw
materials used for specific products. This allocation price is set by the STMA as
the criteria to classifying cigarettes into different categorizes (Gao, Zheng and Hu,
2012). I will classify the quality level of cigarettes as seen in Table 1.1, high-quality
cigarettes are those with allocation prices higher than 50 Renminbi (RMB) per car-
ton; the medium-quality cigarettes are in the price range of 30 RMB to 50 RMB per
carton, while the low-quality products are those cheaper than 30 RMB per carton.
Two other elements of China’s cigarette price system are the suggested wholesale
price and the suggested retail price set by the Chinese National Tobacco Company
(CNTC). Although it and the STMA were intended to be two separate institutions,
in practice, they function as one organization with two different names but under
the same leadership (Liu et al., 2015). The suggested wholesale price is the price
of cigarettes at which wholesalers provide cigarettes to retailers while the suggested
retailer prices are what the retailers charge the consumers.
1.2.2.2 The Reform Process in the Chinese Tobacco Industry
As part of the state-owned enterprise reform, the provincial reforms aimed
to dissolve the local boundaries (Wang, 2009) across the industry. The primary
impact of the consolidation on the cigarette industry was the reduction the number of
manufacturers. Figure 1.2 illustrates that this inter-regional consolidation of tobacco
enterprises reduced the number of manufacturers in the tobacco industry from 44 in
2005 to 27 by 2009.
Figures 1.4 and Figures 1.5 show the organizational system in the tobacco
industry before and after the merger orchestrated by the state. Before the restruc-
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turing, the STMA directly distributed the production quotas to each manufacturer.
Some of the provinces had many firms, while some were a single firm market. After
the reorganization, each province has only one enterprise that decides the quota al-
location. The competition structure in the province with multiple firms significantly
changed after the reform, while provinces with a single firm did not change.
The managers, as the decision-makers of the cigarette manufacturers, are faced
with the same contract, which includes output target and the fulfillment of the state
plan. Howere, unlike in a duopoly scenario, in the monopoly case, the managers do
not face the competition, which carries the chance they may to fail to sell high-quality
cigarettes.
1.3 Theoretical Model
This section presents a theoretical model of the primary argument motiving
the empirical model. I propose a theoretical model illustrating the change in the
quota allocation strategies among tobacco firms in China that varies in the monopoly
and duopoly markets characterized by both quality (vertical) and horizontal differen-
tiation. The setup of this model is adapted from the model in Hotelling (1929), with
modifications being made to determine the effect of quota constraints under differ-
ent market structures. The manufacturer decides each year to allocate the quota for
various quality products. I derive quota-allocation strategies in two scenarios: i) one
manufacturer in the province as a regional tobacco monopoly, ii) two manufacturers
in one region as a duopoly. Several new assumptions on prices are based on the real-
world situation of the Chinese cigarette market. First, the allocation prices are based
on the marginal costs, which are the prices at which producers sell cigarettes to the
STMA, which are regulated by that body. Second, since the STMA is responsible for
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protecting public health by reducing tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke, the
quotas the STMA distributes to the manufacturers are fewer than the total demand
at the given price in the market.
1.3.1 Model Setup
1.3.1.1 Product Variants and Firms
Consider a market in which manufacturers segment their product lines on
multi-products under quota restrictions. Manufacturers can offer two vertically dif-
ferentiated products: a high-quality (good H) and a low-quality (good L). The high-
quality cigarettes have different attributes to attract consumers; for example, they
may have different flavors or a more attractive package. The marginal costs of the
high-quality goods and the low-quality goods are cH and cL, respectively. Since the
marginal costs primarily depend on the raw materials, for example, the tobacco leaves
and filters, we have cH > cL. Under the Chinese cigarette pricing mechanism, the
allocation-wholesale profit margin(wi) set by the STMA is assumed to be exogenous
to the manufacturers. I assume a high-quality products bring higher mark-up for the
manufacturers, specifically, wH > wL (Gao, Zheng and Hu, 2012). The allocation
price faced by the manufacturers is given by
pallocationi = ci(1 + wi) (1.1)
where i ∈ {H,L}. There are two types of market structures: one manufacturer in the
province representing a regional tobacco monopoly market and two manufacturers in
one province representing a duopoly market.
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1.3.1.2 Consumer Preferences
Consumers’ preferences are different along both dimensions. On the one hand,
each consumer has a preference for quality, either low- or high-quality cigarettes.
Because consumers buy cigarettes based on a suggested retail price, also regulated by
the STMA, the suggested retail price is the allocation price with an allocation-retail
profit margin of zi, which can be shown as
pretaili = p
allocation
i (1 + zi) = ci(1 + wi)(1 + zi). (1.2)
Consumers can distinguish the quality level based on the suggested prices. Each
consumer wishes to purchase one unit of the two variants of the cigarettes based
on her income. In this case, low-type consumer will never purchase a high-quality
cigarette because of the suggested retail price and their income. On the other hand,
the high-type consumer can choose the characteristics she wishes for her cigarette.
Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.6 show the consumer preferences. Assume there are a number
of low-type consumers who will never buy high-quality cigarettes and three types of
consumers who prefer high-quality cigarettes. Type A and Type B consumers prefer
to buy cigarettes with a certain attribute, but they are indifference about the quality.
For example, Type A consumer prefers cigarettes with a strawberry flavor, while
Type B consumer only consumes the high-quality cigarettes with red colour package.
Type C consumers in both of the figures buy high-quality cigarettes only, but they
are indifferent regarding the characteristics.
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1.3.1.3 Managers’ Incentives
Since the managers of tobacco enterprises need to fulfill their contracts, I
assume they use all of their quota to cover the full market. 2 In addition, according
to Song Gao (2012), the profit margins for high-quality goods are higher than the
low-quality goods, meaning the managers have the incentive to produce as many
high-quality goods as possible.
1.3.2 Duopoly Analysis
Since products are partial substitutes across different quality segments as Fig-
ure 1.6 shows, the Type A consumer desires only the high-quality cigarettes with
a certain attribute made by Firm 1. Otherwise, she chooses to buy low-quality
cigarettes instead of high-quality cigarettes from another firm. In this case, the man-
agers only have incentives to sell their cigarettes to Type C consumers who only care
about the quality level but indifference between the characteristics. 3 When stealing
the competitors’ market, the managers have the risk failing to sell high-quality goods,
causing negative consequences. Therefore, in the duopoly market, the profit functions
2Recall, as we discussed in the Industrial Background section, the managers in state-owned
enterprises have the responsibility to achieve the targets in the contracts. In the Chinese tobacco
industry, the managers need to first run out of the quota to meet the criterion of the state plan.
Second, managers need to maximize profit. Third, the managers will be negatively impacted by the
cigarettes they fail to sell.
3According to Wang (2009), the share of low-quality cigarettes is dominated the China’s cigarette
market before the industry reorganization. Local governments built small-scale cigarette firms to
satisfy the local need and blocked cigarettes from other regions.
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for Firms 1 and 2 are
π1 = (pL − cL)(1− t)Q+ pHa− cHa+
tQ− a
(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)
2cpH − (tQ− a)cH
− [tQ− a− tQ− a
(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)
2c]I
= (pL − cL)(1− t)Q+ pHa− tQcH +
tQ− a
(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)
2cpH
− [tQ− a− tQ− a
(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)
2c]I
(1.3)
and
π2 = (pL − cL)(1− t
′
)Q+ pHb− cHb+
t
′
Q− b
(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)
2cpH − (t
′
Q− b)cH
− [t′Q− b− t
′
Q− b
(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)
2c]I
= (pL − cL)(1− t
′
)Q+ pHb− t
′
QcH +
t
′
Q− b
(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)
2cpH
− [t′Q− b− tQ− a
(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)
2c]I.
(1.4)
The term (tQ − a)/(tQ − a + t′Q − b) in Equation 1.3 represents the probability
for Firm 1 selling high-quality cigarettes to Type C consumers successfully, while
(t
′
Q − b)/(tQ − a + t′Q − b) in Equation 1.4 represents the probability for Firm 2
doing so.
For Firm 1, the first order condition of π1 with respect to t is
∂π1
∂t
= −(pL − cL)Q− cHQ+
Q[tQ− a+ t′Q− b]−Q(tQ− a)
[(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)]2
2cpH
− [Q− Q[tQ− a+ t
′
Q− b]−Q(tQ− a)
[(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)]2
2c]I
= 0.
(1.5)
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For Firm 2, the first order condition of π2 with respect to t
′
is
∂π2
∂t′
= −(pL − cL)Q− cHQ+
Q[tQ− a+ t′Q− b]−Q(t′Q− b)
[(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)]2
2cpH
− [Q− Q[tQ− a+ t
′
Q− b]−Q(t′Q− b)
[(tQ− a) + (t′Q− b)]2
2c]I
= 0.
(1.6)
By symmetry, we assume two enterprises allocate the same proportion to high-quality
goods, which is t = t
′
. In addition, we assume the market for the Type A consumer
is the same size as the one for the Type B consumer, a = b for simplification. Thus,
the first-order condition can be shown as
∂π1
∂t
= −(pL − cL)Q− cHQ+
Q(tQ− a)
[2(tQ− a)]2
2cpH − [Q−
Q(tQ− a)
[2(tQ− a)]2
2c]I
= −(pL − cL)− cH +
cpH + cI
2(tQ− a)
− I
= 0.
(1.7)
Equation 1.7 represents the proportion which the manager allocates to high-
quality cigarettes
td =
a
Q
+
cpH + cI
2Q(cH + I + pL − cL)
. (1.8)
1.3.3 Monopoly Analysis
As Figure 1.7 shows, the demand for high-quality cigarettes in each local
market is all Type A, Type B, and Type C consumers. The total quota for the
monopoly is 2Q; the total demand can be shown as 2(a+ b+ c). Then the share that
manufacturers would like to allocate to high-quality cigarettes under the monopoly
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case, which is
tm =
2(a+ b+ c)
2Q
. (1.9)
Since the two local markets are identical, we cancel out the two in both the numerator
and the denominator. To simplify our model, we also assume the demand for the Type
A consumer and the Type B consumer are the same. Thus, we have a = b. The final
result can be shown as follows
tm =
a+ b+ c
Q
=
2a+ c
Q
(1.10)
1.3.4 Conclusions and Predictions from the Theoretical Model
Proposition 1. When (2a + c)(cH + I + pL − cL) > c(pH − cH + cL − pL),
then the percentage of the quota that manufacturers allocate to high-quality goods
is higher in the monopoly market than in the duopoly market.
Proof. The difference in the proportion of the quota allocated to the high-quality
cigarettes in the two different markets is
tm − td = 2a
Q
+
c
Q
− a
Q
− cpH + cI
2Q(cH + I + pL − cL)
=
a
Q
+
c
Q
− cpH + cI
2Q(cH + I + pl − cL)
=
(2a+ c)(cH + I + pL − cL) + c(cH + pL − cL − pH)
2Q(cH + I + pL − cL)
.
(1.11)
Since 2Q(cH+I+pL−cL) is always greater than zero when (2a+c)(cH+I+pL−cL) >
c(pH − cH + cL − pL), we have tm − td > 0, which means that the share of the quota
of high-quality cigarettes is lower when there is regional competition.
Proposition 2.∂t
d
∂I
< 0 for all I. When in the duopoly market, the negative
consequences for not meeting the criterion cause the managers to reduce the quota
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they allocate to high-quality goods from what it is in the monopoly scenario.
Proof.
∂td
∂I
=
c
2Q
(cH + I + pL − cL)− (pH + I)
cH + I + pL − cL
=
c
2Q
(cH + pL − cL − pH)
cH + I + pL − cL
=
c
2Q
wL − wH
cH + I + pL − cL
.
(1.12)
Recalling the profit margin of the high-quality cigarettes is higher than the
profit margin of the low-quality cigarette, we have wL < wH ,
∂td
∂I
< 0 always exists.
Proposition 2 is the key support for the main argument in this study. The property
of mission-oriented contracts for managers in state-owned enterprises leads to a lower
proportion of high-quality goods. As the negative consequences increase, the ratio
that managers allocate to high-quality goods decreases.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Production Data
The primary source of data for this study is from the STMA database, which
is the monthly firm-brand level data on cigarette production from January 2005 to
December 2011. All cigarettes are classified into five categories based on allocation
prices.4 The STMA adjusted the classification allocation prices in 2009. Details of
cigarette classification from high to low are shown in Table 1.1, information not used
here because this research focuses on quota-allocation strategies. All manufacturers
faced the same standardization changes. All empirical studies in this paper are based
on the three categories of cigarette allocation prices shown in the first column in
Table 1.1. The luxury brands for high-quality cigarettes are those with allocation
4I used the standard of classification from the China Tobacco Year Books between 2005–2011.
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prices higher than 50 RMB per carton, and the medium-quality cigarettes are those
with allocation prices between 30 RMB to 50 RMB per carton, while the low-quality
cigarettes are those cheaper than 30 RMB per carton.
Figure 1.8 shows the total output of cigarettes across China from the year
2003 to the year 2012. The total number produced increases smoothly from 17,905
hundred million sticks in the year 2003 to 25,160 hundred million in the year 2012. The
entire production of high-quality and medium-quality cigarettes traces the increasing
trend, while the production of low-quality cigarettes decreases from the year 2009.
Figure 1.9 presents the direction of the market share for the entire market from the
year 2003 to the year 2012. The market share of low-quality cigarettes declines while
the percentage of medium-quality cigarettes increases.
The proportion of quota for each product segment is the primary variable of
interest in this study. Since different manufacturers have different quotas, which vary
across provinces, to study the quota allocation strategies, this paper chooses to use
proportion instead of quantity. Another advantage of using share is to address the
effect of growing cigarette consumption.
1.4.2 Forced Mergers
Data were collected on the state-led merger movement of regional tobacco
enterprises over time by the author. Table 1.2 shows the reorganization date in each
province, represented as t0. Git is a dummy variable constructed based on Table 1.2.
I divide my sample into two groups based on the type of reform. Git equals to 1 if
there exist multiple enterprises before the reform, equals to 0 if only the organizational
system is reconstructed. The different types of reform are shown geographically in
Figure 1.10. The dark blue areas on the map indicate the provinces with multiple
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manufacturers before the reform, while the light blue areas represent the provinces
with a single firm before the reorganization. Mit is another dummy variable in our
empirical analysis, Mit equals 0 if it is before the reform occurring at time t0, and Mit
equals 1 if a province completes the horizontal merger in time t, meaning post t0.
1.4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 provide the summary statistics for the variables used
in this analysis. Based on the different types of reform, I decompose provinces into
two categories according to the number of firms before the reform: the reorganized
group with a single manufacturer before the reform and the merged group with mul-
tiple manufacturers before the reform. Table 1.3 shows the summary statistics for the
proportion of the quota allocated to each quality, constructed based on three different
quality levels (high, medium, and low) for the two different groups before and after
the reorganization. The summary statistics reveal differences across groups, but Fig-
ure 1.11 and Figure 1.12 show interesting patterns not seen in the summary statistics.
The vertical dashed lines at t0 represent the time that the merger was implemented.
Different dynamic trends of quota allocation are shown in Figure 1.11 and Figure 1.12
across the two different groups. For the single firm reorganized group, the mean of
the proportion of the quota for low-quality cigarettes decreases, a trend that remains
constant after the reconstruction. For the merged group with several firms, the mean
proportion of low-quality goods increases. After the merger, when there is only one
firm in the province, there exist common trends in the two groups, meaning the quota
allocation decisions are the same as the reorganized group.
Table 1.4 represents the summary statistics on the province-level control vari-
ables, which include the natural logarithm of the population, the unemployment rate,
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the log of personal income per capita, the log of consumption index, and the natural
logarithm of GDP.
I use these data to test whether the quota-allocation strategies are different
between market structures with a regional monopoly market, and with a regional
duopoly market.
1.5 Empirical Research Design
According to the theoretical predictions, under quota regulation, a manager
should assign a larger proportion to high-quality goods when he is the only producer in
the area. This section explores how different market structures influence a manager’s
quota allocation strategy empirically by using an event study and a triple-difference
model.
1.5.1 Empirical Specification: The Event Study Model
The baseline model exploits the impact of the exogenous horizontal merger
in the Chinese cigarette industry. I use an event study model based on Goolsbee
and Syverson (2008) to estimate the dynamic treatment effects using fixed effects
regression, which includes a series of leads and lags of the merger while controlling
for other influences, and two groups, “treatment” and “control”, as follows:
Yit =
3∑
τ=−3
βM,to+τ [(Merger)to+τ ∗ I(Group)] + γ ∗Xit + θq + εit, (1.13)
where i indexes the province and t the month. Yit is the outcome of interest, the
percentage of production of high-quality cigarettes, medium-quality cigarettes, and
low-quality cigarettes. The time t0 represents the time that the merger event occurred
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in province i.5 Mergerto+τ is an indicator variable for whether the reconstruction was
implemented in the province i at the period to+ τ . Mergerto+τ are the six half-year
dummies surrounding the period when the merger happens. The lead dummies are
indicators for 0-6 months, 6-12 months, and 12-18 months before the merger, while the
lags represent 0-6 months, 6-12 months, and 12-18 months post the merger. I(Group)
denotes the type of the merged group, equalling 1 if there exist multiple manufacturers
before the reform and 0 if there is only one manufacturer. The vector Xit contains
a set of province-level control variables that include the natural logarithm of the
population, the unemployment rate, the log of personal income per capita, the log of
consumption index, and the natural logarithm of GDP. I also include fixed effects for
the season (θq). The error term εit is a province-month specific error term.
1.5.2 Empirical Specification: The Triple-Difference Model
Triple-difference model (DDD) estimation is one of the most widely used quasi-
experimental tools for identifying the impacts of policy treatments. As specified
previously, the horizontal merger in China’s cigarette industry is exogenous. To
exploit the effects of the mergers, I estimate a triple-difference model (DDD) on the
pooled sample following Goodman-Bacon (2018) in the form:
Yit = β0 + β1 ∗ dMit + β2 ∗ dGit + β3 ∗ dMit ∗ dGit + δ0 ∗ Time+ δ1 ∗ Time ∗ dMit
+ δ2 ∗ Time ∗ dGit + δ3 ∗ Time ∗ dGit ∗ dMit + γ ∗Xit + θq + εit,
(1.14)
where Yit is the outcome variable, the share of production allocated for cigarettes at
three different quality levels for province i at month t. Mit is the treatment dummy
variable. Mit equals 0 if before the reform, while Mit is defined to be 0 if post the
5Recall: The merger times for each province are shown in Table 1.2
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reform. Git indicates the group dummy, defined as 0 for the reorganized group and
1 for the merged group. I also control the seasonal fixed effects, which are denoted
by θq. I estimate Equation 1.14 using monthly data from the year 2005 to the year
2011.
1.6 Results
Figure 1.13 to Figure 1.15 plot the event study coefficients βM,to+τ . The hori-
zontal axis represents the time, where t0− 1 represents 0-6 months before the merger
event, while t0 + 1 represents 0-6 months after the reform. Each time bin includes 6
months. Figure 1.13 presents the effects of the reform treatment on high-quality
cigarettes. This plot shows the deviation of the share allocated for high-quality
cigarettes in the control group when we control for province characteristics and sea-
sonal fixed effects. Similarly, Figure 1.14 shows the effects of the reform treatment for
the medium-quality cigarettes, and Figure 1.15 presents the results of the reform treat-
ment for the low-quality cigarettes. For high-quality cigarettes, the coefficients are
not significant. However, the coefficients for the medium-quality cigarettes are signif-
icant, with the sign remaining negative until t0+2. Figure 1.14 shows that the merger
begins to affect medium-quality cigarettes a half-year after the reform. The merged
manufacturers allocate more share of their quotas to medium-quality cigarettes com-
pared to the control group. Figure 1.15 presents the effect of the merger treatment
on low-quality cigarettes. The finding shows that the merger significantly decreases
the proportion of the quotas the manufacturers allocate for low-quality cigarettes..
Table 1.5 presents the results of the event study model based on the estimation
of Equation 1.13. The coefficients of our variables of interest capture the difference
between the treatment groups and the control groups in the period around the event
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point. From one and a half years before the merger until a half-year after the merger,
provinces with multiple firms allocated a larger proportion of their quotas to low-
quality cigarettes and less to the medium-quality cigarettes every six months than
the single-firm market. Since t0 +2, which is six months after the merger, the merged
manufacturers produce more shares of high-quality cigarettes than the reorganized
manufacturers. The lag effect shown in the results is because the adjustment of the
production plan takes time. Our results are all significant at the one percent level,
suggesting there’s a strong merger effect. There are also some interesting findings for
our control variables. The manufacturers in the provinces with consumption level and
GDP allocate a larger proportion of their quotas to high-quality and medium-quality
cigarettes.
Table 1.6 shows the different effects of horizontal mergers for two market struc-
tures. Each column shows a regression of the quota-allocation on different levels of
products on time dummies, type of merger dummies, and other province-level control
variables. The results indicate that a higher proportion of the quota is allocated to
low-quality cigarettes in a multiple firm market than in a single-firm market, while
the single-firm market allocates a higher proportion of the quota to medium-quality
cigarettes. The coefficient of the term Merge*Type*Time captures the difference be-
tween the quota allocated to the specific quality cigarettes between the two groups
before and after the merger.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effectiveness of the government forced horizontal
merger on quota allocation strategies for different quality cigarettes by providing both
theoretical and empirical models. State-owned enterprises play an essential role in
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China, and the Chinese cigarette industry is a good example for studying managers’
strategies for quota allocation under the regulations for different market structures.
This paper provides both theoretical and empirical findings for the quality
choice under quota constraints and fixed pricing under the exogenous horizontal
merger in China’s cigarette industry. The theoretical model indicates that in the
duopoly market, the managers have more incentive to lower the share of the quota to
high-quality cigarettes than in the monopoly scenario, but allocate more proportion
of the quota on the low-quality cigarettes. The potential explanation for these results
is that the managers of the state-owned enterprises need to meet the targets in their
contracts; specifically, managers in the Chinese cigarette industry need to fill their
quotas as mandated by the state plan and sell their product successfully. Faced with
the serious consequences for their inventory, the managers in the duopoly scenario
reduce the share of their quota for high-quality cigarettes because of the competition
from the manufacturer in the same province.
My empirical results confirm the theoretical predictions. When the allocation
of the quotas across the different quality cigarettes is the only competitive strategy the
manufacturers can use, the share of high-quality cigarettes in the oligopoly markets
is lower than in the monopoly markets. This strategy results because consumers who
prefer low-quality cigarettes are more price elastic, so producers allocate more quota
to low-quality cigarettes to capture more market shares to fulfill the targets stipulated
by the representative bureaus. The horizontal merger avoids the high cooperation fee
between firms, increasing the proportion of higher quality cigarettes in the market.
Our model has several limitations. First, it analyzes only the monopoly and
duopoly markets, but in reality, there were usually more than two manufacturers in
the provinces before the reform. In addition, we assume the two manufacturers are
symmetric. Therefore, asymmetric cases should be considered. These limitations
22
provide areas for future research.
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Figure 1.1: Tax and Revenue in the cigarette industry
Note: Data Sources: China Tobacco Yearbooks between 2005–2011.
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Figure 1.2: Number of Firms
Note: Data Sources: China Tobacco Yearbooks. The number of cigarette manufacturers decreases
from 44 to 27 from year 2005 too 2011.
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Figure 1.3: The Industrial Organization
Note: The State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA) distributes the production quotas to
each company, the manufacturers sell the cigarettes back to STMA by allocation prices. The
allocation prices are set based on the production cost.
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Figure 1.4: The Industrial Organization Before the Reconstruction
Note: This figure shows the organization before the reconstruction. The State Tobacco Monopoly
Administration (STMA) directly distributes the production quotas to each manufacturer.
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Figure 1.5: The Industrial Organization After the Reconstruction
Note: This figure shows the organization after the reform. The State Tobacco Monopoly
Administration (STMA) distributes the quota to the province-level enterprises.
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Figure 1.6: Model for Duopoly Market
Note: The figure shows the market segments in the duopoly market. Two manufacturers own their
low-quality cigarette markets. In the first market, Type A consumer desire the high-quality
products with particular characteristic from Firm 1, Type B consumers can not find the
high-quality products with her desired feature, she will buy low-quality cigarettes instead. Type C
consumers are those who always consume high-quality cigarettes. Type B consumers in the second
market will buy the cigarettes produced by Firm 2 for her desired characteristics, while Type A
consumers will buy low-quality cigarettes. Firm 1 and Firm 2 will compete for Type C consumers
in other’s market.
29
Figure 1.7: Model for Monopoly Market
Note: The figure presents the segments of the monopoly market. There are two types of
consumers. Type L consumers prefer low-quality cigarettes. Type A, Type B, and Type C are
consumers who desire high-quality cigarettes.
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Figure 1.8: Number of Production
Note: Data Sources: China Tobacco Yearbooks between 2005–2011.
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Figure 1.9: Trend of market share
Note: Data Sources: China Tobacco Yearbooks between 2005–2011.
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Figure 1.10: Provinces with different restructuration
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(a) High-Quality Cigarettes
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(b) Medium-Quality Cigarettes
Figure 1.11: The Mean of Percentage for High-Quality and Medium-Quality
Cigarettes
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Figure 1.12: The Mean of Percentage for Low-Quality Cigarettes
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Figure 1.13: Share on High-Quality Cigarettes: Deviation From Control Group
Note: This figure is a plot of the event study coefficients βM,to+τ from regression Equation 1.13 for
high-quality cigarettes. The black dots represent the regression coefficients. All regressions control
for province characteristics and seasonal fixed effect. The confidence intervals are at 95% level.
36
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Sh
ar
e 
on
 M
ed
iu
m
-Q
ua
lit
y 
C
ig
ar
et
te
s
to-3 to-2 to-1 to+1 to+2 to+3
Event Time
Figure 1.14: Share on Medium-Quality Cigarettes: Deviation From Control Group
Note: This figure is a plot of the event study coefficients βM,to+τ from regression Equation 1.13 for
medium-quality cigarettes. The black dots represent the regression coefficients. All regressions
control for province characteristics and seasonal fixed effect. The confidence intervals are at 95%
level.
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Figure 1.15: Share on Low-Quality Cigarettes: Deviation From Control Group
Note: This figure is a plot of the event study coefficients βM,to+τ from regression Equation 1.13 for
low-quality cigarettes. The black dots represent the regression coefficients. All regressions control
for province characteristics and seasonal fixed effect. The confidence intervals are at 95% level.
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Table 1.1: Categories Based on Allocation Prices
Category Price Range Before 2008 After 2008
High(C1) [50,∞] [50,∞]
[100,∞)
[50,100)
Medium(C2) [30, 50) [30,50) [30,50)
Low(C3) [0, 30)
[15,30)
[16.5,30)
[10,15)
[0,16.5)
[0,10)
Note:
Data Sources: China Tobacco Yearbooks between 2005–2011.
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Table 1.2: Reconstruction Time
Province ReconstructionTime
Merged Manufactures
Hongta January, 2005
Hubei July, 2005
Shanxi June, 2006
Anhui July, 2006
Shandong December, 2006
Zhejiang December, 2006
Sichuan December, 2006
Hunan March, 2007
Jiangsu June, 2007
Henan July, 2007
Hongyunhonghe May, 2009
Jiangxi July, 2009
Fujian January, 2010
Reconstructed Manufactures
Shanghai January, 2005
Chongqing January, 2005
Guizhou January, 2007
Jilin January, 2007
Guangdong January, 2007
Guangxi January, 2007
Heilongjiang September, 2007
Shenzhen September, 2007
Gansu December, 2007
Hubei May, 2009
Note:
The reconstruction time is the time when the manufacturers change
their names .
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for Main Variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev N Max Min
Reconstructed: Before
High 0.060 0.076 209 0.757 0
Medium 0.199 0.218 209 0.770 0
Low 0.741 0.252 209 1 0.023
Reconstructed: After
High 0.240 0.308 727 1 0
Medium 0.279 0.263 727 1 0
Low 0.482 0.356 727 1 0
Merged: Before
High 0.130 0.093 314 0.504 0.004
Medium 0.222 0.132 314 0.491 0.01
Low 0.648 0.179 314 0.948 0 .283
Merged:After
High 0.162 0.172 562 0.737 0.001
Medium 0.209 0.141 562 0.695 0
Low 0.629 0.215 562 0.959 0.029
41
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics for Control variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
GDP 11539.09 10677.81 248.8 53210.28
Population 4419.407 2782.886 280 10505
Unemployment rate 3.703 0.632 1.4 5.6
Personal income per capita 29352.19 11550.8 13688 77031
Note:
Data Sources: China Statistical Yearbooks between 2005–2011.
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Table 1.5: Event Study Results
Expensive Medium Low
to-3 0.0205 -0.142*** 0.122**
(0.0502) (0.0498) (0.0611)
to-2 0.0224 -0.126*** 0.104*
(0.0486) (0.0483) (0.0592)
to-1 0.0102 -0.200*** 0.190***
(0.0508) (0.0505) (0.0619)
to+1 -0.0161 -0.135*** 0.151***
(0.0443) (0.0440) (0.0539)
to+2 0.105** 0.113*** -0.218***
(0.0417) (0.0414) (0.0508)
to+3 0.0387 0.113*** -0.151***
(0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0426)
ln(Population) -0.377*** 0.0248 0.352***
(0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0236)
Unemployment Rate 0.108*** 0.0222** -0.130***
(0.0896) (0.0089) (0.0109)
ln(income) -0.365*** 0.0931*** 0.263***
(0.0288) (0.0286) (0.0350)
ln(GDP) 0.330*** 0.0770*** -0.407***
(0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0183)
constant 3.615*** -1.653*** -0.961**
(0.329) (0.326) (0.400)
N 1812 1812 1812
adj. R-sq 0.298 0.159 0.363
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes
Note:
Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are
denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Triple-Difference Regression Results
Expensive Medium Low
Time 0.00122 0.00207 -0.00329**
(0.00135) (0.00134) (0.00164)
Merge Dummy 0.0904*** -0.0183 -0.0722**
(0.0292) (0.0291) (0.0355)
Type Dummy 0.0600* -0.128*** 0.0682*
(0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0411)
Merge*Type Dummy -0.0617 0.0678* -0.00611
(0.0388) (0.0386) (0.0471)
Merge*Time 0.00139 -0.00117 -0.000224
(0.00138) (0.00137) (0.00167)
Type*Time -0.00128 -0.00909*** 0.0104***
(0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00220)
Merge*Type*Time -0.000789 0.00753*** -0.00675***
(0.00188) (0.00187) (0.00228)
ln(Population) -0.394*** 0.0225 0.372***
(0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0238)
Unemployment Rate 0.101*** 0.0223** -0.123***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
ln(income) -0.433*** 0.0893*** 0.344***
(0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0396)
ln(GDP) 0.347*** 0.0827*** -0.430***
(0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0185)
constant 4.230*** -1.674*** -1.556***
(0.362) (0.361) (0.440)
N 1812 1812 1812
adj. R-sq 0.311 0.167 0.377
Seasonal FE Yes Yes Yes
Note:
Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are de-
noted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Horizontal Mergers
on Inventory: Evidence from
China’s Cigarette Industry
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates how government ownership affects managers’ decisions
under different market structures. In highly regulated markets, firms face inflexible
prices and uncertain demand (Carlton, 1978). The cigarette market in China provides
an excellent opportunity for studying firm behavior in such markets. In the Chinese
cigarette market, the allocation prices by which firms sell cigarettes to the State
Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA) are fixed and, thus, do not depend on
the supply or the demand. Moreover, the demand for cigarettes fluctuates over time.
In this paper, we study how the inventory of cigarette firms in China responds to the
change in market structure caused by the mandate consolidation of the industry.
In general, economists analyze oligopolistic competition using models based on
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price (Bertrand, 1883) or quantity (Cournot, 1838) as the decision-makers’ competi-
tion strategies vary. However, in Chinese cigarette market, the prices are regulated
by the STMA, which is only based on the marginal cost of the product. In addition,
it also mandates the total quotas each manufacturer can produce; the manufactur-
ers cannot produce more than thire quotas because they do not have the necessary
permit. In such a highly regulated industry, the quota allocation for different qual-
ity cigarettes is the only competitive strategy the managers have available to them.
Since the mandated consolidation occurred between the years 2006 and 2007, we
have the opportunity to observe changes resulting from the different market struc-
tures. Before the reform, some of the provinces had a single firm, referred to as a
regional monopoly, while others had multiple firms before the reform, referred to as
a duopoly. In a duopoly market, managers face a cooperative or non-cooperative
situation. A large body of literature has analyzed duopoly competition to determine
the equilibrium that results from the prisoners’ dilemma having to choose whether
to cooperate or not (Lambertini, 1997; Levitan and Shubik, 1972). The prediction
based on our theoretical model indicates that because of the prisoners’ dilemma, the
manufacturers in a duopoly tend to overproduce high-quality cigarettes to steal this
market from their competitors even though this decision increases their inventory of
high-quality goods and the managers face retribution for the failure of the tasks.
It is challenging to measure firm performance in absolute terms (Marengo,
1992). In this paper, we use the change in inventory before and after the consolidation
to study how the reform in the market structure affects firm performance. We use
inventory as the vehicle for studying firm behavior in a highly regulated industry with
demand uncertainty, investigating how mandated consolidation as an exogenous shock
to the market affects inventory. This paper provides evidence for how a cooperative
and non-cooperative market situation affects a manager’s decisions.
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Two reasons cause a need for an inventory: uncertain demand and competition
resulting from decisions made by competitors. Krane (1994) investigated the trade-off
between holding costs and stockout costs, focusing on asymmetric adjustment. The
study reported here examined the trade-off between earning a higher profit margin
from high-quality cigarettes and the risk of negative consequences because of the
inventory, the situation faced by managers in the Chinese cigarette market. When
cigarette manufacturers have a monopoly in the region, this situation functions like
a cooperative market; they need to consider only the demand uncertainty. How-
ever, when it is a duopoly market, the managers must not only consider the demand
uncertain but also the competition.
The theoretical model developed here includes the demand uncertainty in both
a monopoly and a duopoly market. Faced with demand uncertainty and competition,
the managers in the latter maximize their profits after meeting their quotas. The
managers face a trade-off between higher profit-margins from high-quality cigarettes
and negative consequences for having an inventory. The model predicts that under
different market competition situations, the monopoly always has a smaller inventory
than the duopoly. Furthermore, the worse the consequences for the inventory, the
smaller the inventory held by the duopoly managers.
This paper is the first to empirically investigate the causal effect of the reform
of the market structure on the cigarette industry in relation to the conditions man-
dated by the STMA on the inventory. To address the reorganized group, which histor-
ically comprised of a single firm in the province serves as our control and the multiple
firms merged group is our treatment group. In addition, since this study includes
both the pre-treatment period and the post-treatment period, I use a difference-in-
difference model to examine how the cooperate and non-cooperate market structure
affects the inventory.
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My results suggest that compared with the single firm reorganized group
when multiple firms merged into a sole manufacturer, the inventory of high-quality
cigarettes and medium-quality cigarettes decreased significantly while the inventory
of low-quality cigarettes increased. In addition, when there was regional competition,
the inventory was higher than when the manufacturer was a monopoly in the local
market.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
theoretical model. Section 2.3 presents the data and how the main variables are
generated, followed by statistical descriptions of the primary variables. Section 2.4
introduces the empirical strategy applied to this study. Section 2.5 offers the main
empirical results, and Section 2.6 provides conclusions and suggestions for future
work.
2.2 Theoretical Model
The following theoretical model is an adaptation of the Hotelling (1929) model,
which predicts how a change in the market structure affects firm inventory. The setup
is based on the model in Desai (2001). Several new assumptions are made in this study
to investigate the highly regulated Chinese cigarette market and the effect of demand
uncertainty on different market structures. An alternative specification of the model
includes the demand uncertainty for both high and low quality products. In the real
world, multiple firm condition would include more than two firms in the same region.
For simplification, we consider on two firms in competition in our theoretical model.
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2.2.1 Model Setup
2.2.1.1 Product Variants and Firms
The Chinese cigarette market includes two vertical differentiated products:
a high-quality (good H) and a low-quality (good L). For each manufacturer, the
marginal costs for the high-quality goods and the low-quality goods are cH and cL,
respectively. Under the Chinese cigarette pricing mechanism, the allocation-wholesale
profit margin(wi) is set by the STMA, which is assumed to be exogenous to the man-
ufacturers. We assume high-quality products bring a higher mark-up for the manu-
facturers, in particular, wH > wL. The allocation price faced by the manufacturers is
given by
pallocationi = ci(1 + wi), (2.1)
where i ∈ {H,L}. We consider the monopoly case where there is only one manufac-
turer in the province and the duopoly case where there are two manufacturers in the
province.
Since there is demand uncertain, in the theoretical model, we suppose there
are two states: the demand for high-quality goods in the high-state condition is
DHH = DH(1 + ∆L), and in the low-state is D
L
H = DH(1−∆L). DHL = DL(1 + ∆L)
and DLL = DL(1−∆L) are the demand for low-quality cigarettes in the high state and
the low state, respectively. There are two probabilities that each state would occur.
The demand for cigarettes is high occurs with the probability ProbH , while the low
state occurs with the probability ProbL. We make two assumptions for analysis:
based on their contracts, the managers of the state-owned enterprises use all their
quotas and for low-quality goods, the production QL is always less than the low-state
demand DLL, which is shown by QL < D
L
L.
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2.2.1.2 Consumer Preferences
Consumer j has preference along the quality dimension, which is captured by
parameters(xj). Each consumer has a most preferred product xj, with xj ∈ [0, 1] as
in Hotelling (1929) . There are two consumer segments, a high-valuation segment
and a low-valuation segment, based on their different valuations for quality. High-
valuation segment consumers are more willing to pay a higher price for luxury brand
products. I assume that customer types differ only in their willingness to pay for
product quality, the only dimension of differentiated vertical product (Mussa and
Rosen, 1978). Therefore, consumer j has the following indirect utility for purchasing
product i:
U(θi, xj) = θi − ki |xj − xi| − pretaili , (2.2)
where i ∈ {H,L} represents the quality of goods they consume. θH(θL) represents
that a consumer derives a utility from using a product of a high quality or low
quality. As shown in Equation 2.4, I refer to xi = 0 as the low-quality cigarettes
and xi = 1 as the high-quality cigarettes. Ki represents a transportation cost, which
captures the intensity of the taste preference. KH represents the cost the consumer
who prefers to buy low-quality goods transfer to buy high-quality goods, while kL is
the transportation cost that consumers who usually buy high-quality good change to
buy low-quality goods. Since it is likely that higher valuation consumers also have
stronger taste preferences, I assume kH < kL. P
retail
i is the suggested retail price that
consumers pay when they buy cigarettes. Suggested retail prices, the market prices
the STMA suggests to the retailer, are given as
pretaili = p
allocation
i (1 + zi) = ci(1 + wi)(1 + zi), (2.3)
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where zi is the allocation-retail profit margin. The consumer’s ideal point, which is
given by xj, is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1].
L = 0 H = 1t
1-tt
xi =

0 i=low quality
1 i=high quality
(2.4)
2.2.2 Monopoly Analysis
The managers of tobacco enterprises need to meet the requirements of their
contracts, including meeting both the output and profit targets. In addition, we also
assume that wH > wL, meaning high-quality cigarettes bring higher profit margins
than low-quality cigarettes. Thus, managers have the incentive to produce as many
high-quality goods as possible. Based on the indirect utility function given in Equa-
tion 2.2, the marginal consumers who are indifferent to which quality of cigarette
they purchase when U(θH , x) = U(θL, x), which satisfies
θH − kH(1− x)− pretailH = θL − kLx− pretailL , (2.5)
the above equality simplifies to
x∗ =
(pretailH − pretailL )− (θH − θL) + kH
kH + kL
. (2.6)
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Recalling that pretaili = p
allocation
i (1 + zi) = ci(1 + wi)(1 + zi), the marginal consumer
satisfies
x∗ =
cH(1 + wH)(1 + zH)− cL(1 + wL)(1 + zL)− (θH − θL) + kH
kH + kL
. (2.7)
Since in the monopoly market, the two variants consumers do not change from a given
segment because the segment’s self-selection constraints are satisfied, the demand for
high-quality cigarette is:
DH = 1− x∗ =
kL − cH(1 + wH)(1 + zH) + cL(1 + wL)(1 + zL) + (θH − θL)
kH + kL
(2.8)
We first analyze the monopolists’ profits across two scenarios: i) the demand
is in the high state, are both the high-quality cigarettes and the low-quality cigarettes
do not have inventory, and ii) the demand is in the low state, and the monopolist
can sell all the low-quality cigarettes because of the assumption that QL < D
L
L, but
the monopolist will have inventory for the high-quality cigarettes. For the high-state
market, the profit function for the monopolist is
πH = (pL − cL)QL + (PH − cH)QH
= (pL − cL)(1− t)Q+ (PH − cH)tQ,
(2.9)
where t is the share that the manager in the monopoly market decides to allocate for
high-quality cigarettes.
The profit in the low-state is
πL = (pL − cL)QL +DLHPH − cHQH − (QH −DLH)I
= (pL − cL)(1− t)Q+DLHPH − tQcH − (tQ−DLH)I,
(2.10)
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The expected profit is given by
E(π) = ProbHπH + ProbLπL. (2.11)
For simplicity, we assume that the probability for the high state ProbH and
the low state ProbL are both equal to 0.5. Then our expected profit function can be
written as
E(π) = 0.5[(pL − cL)(1− t)Q+ (pH − cH)tQ]
+ 0.5[(pL − cL)(1− t)Q+DLHPH − tQcH − (tQ−DLH)I].
(2.12)
The first order condition of E(π) with respect to t yields
∂Eπ
∂t
= 0.5[−(pL − cL)Q+ (pH − cH)Q] + 0.5[−(pL − cL)Q− cHQ− IQ]
= −(pL − cL)Q+ 0.5(pH − cH)Q− 0.5cHQ− 0.5QI
= [−(pL − cL)− cH − 0.5I + 0.5pH ]Q.
(2.13)
Since the result from the first-order condition is always less than 0, we can obtain
two corner solutions. We will discuss the corner solutions based on the condition of
whether the marginal benefit for producing one unit of high-quality goods is larger or
smaller than the marginal cost. If the marginal benefit is more significant than the
marginal cost, which is
pL − cL + cH + 0.5I < 0.5pH , (2.14)
then the monopolist will choose to produce as many high-quality goods as in the high
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state, and the share allocated to the high-quality products will be
t =
DH(1 + ∆L)
Q
. (2.15)
On the other hand, if the marginal benefit is less than the marginal cost, which means
pL − cL + cH + 0.5I > 0.5pH , (2.16)
the proportion of the high-quality goods will be
t =
DH(1−∆L)
Q
. (2.17)
If we assume half of the enterprises face the high-state situation, then the inventory
is zero, while for the half facing the low-state situation, the inventory is
InventoryMonopoly =
DH(1 + ∆L)−DH(1−∆L)
2
=
2∆LDH
2
= ∆LDH .
(2.18)
2.2.3 Duopoly Analysis
The demand for low-quality cigarettes is high enough, and the total quotas
are lower than the market demand because of the regulation policy. In this case, the
probability that the high-quality cigarettes sell on the duopoly market depends not
only on the manager’s strategy but also on the competitor’s strategy.
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the duopoly case, the profit function in the high-state for Firm One is
πHone = pL(1− t)Q− cL(1− t)Q+
t
t+ t′
DHHpHIn− tQcH − (tQ−
t
t+ t′
DHH )I,
(2.19)
and the profit function for Firm Two is
πHtwo = pL(1− t
′
)Q− cL(1− t
′
)Q+
t
′
t′ + t
DHHpH − t
′
QcH − (t
′
Q− t
′
t′ + t
DHH )I.
(2.20)
where t and t
′
are the proportion that the managers of Firm One and Firm Two
allocate for high-quality cigarettes. Our profit function comprises three parts. The
first part is the profit from selling low-quality cigarettes. The second part of the
function is the profit from selling high-quality cigarettes, where the probability of
selling high-quality cigarettes is expressed as t/(t+ t
′
) and t
′
/(t+ t
′
). The third part
of the profit function is the negative consequences for managers with an inventory.
The profit function for the duopoly in the low condition for Firm One is
πLone = pL(1− t)Q− cL(1− t)Q+
t
t+ t′
DLHpH − tQcH − (tQ−
t
t+ t′
DLH)I, (2.21)
and the profit function for the duopoly in the low state for Firm Two is
πLtwo = pL(1− t
′
)Q− cL(1− t
′
)Q+
t
′
t′ + t
DLHpH − t
′
QcH − (t
′
Q− t
′
t′ + t
DLH)I.
(2.22)
For simplification, we assume that the probability for both states to occur is 0.5. The
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expected profit for both firms yields
E(πone) = Prob
HπHone + Prob
LπLone
= 0.5(pL − cL)(1− t)Q+ 0.5
t
t+ t′
DHHPH − 0.5tQcH − 0.5(tQ−
t
t+ t′
DHH )I
+ 0.5(pL − cL)(1− t)Q+ 0.5
t
t+ t′
DLHPH − 0.5tQcH − 0.5(tQ−
t
t+ t′
DLH)I,
(2.23)
and
E(πtwo) = Prob
HπHtwo + Prob
LπLtwo
= 0.5(pL − cL)(1− t
′
)Q+ 0.5
t
′
t+ t′
DHHPH − 0.5t
′
QcH − 0.5(t
′
Q− t
′
t+ t′
DHH )I
+ 0.5[(pL − cL)(1− t
′
)Q+ 0.5
t
′
t+ t′
DLHPH − 0.5t
′
QcH − 0.5(t
′
Q− t
′
t+ t′
DLH)I.
(2.24)
Firms maximize expected profits. We assume that the two agents in the duopoly
market are symmetric; therefore, the quota they allocate for high-quality cigarettes
would be the same as t = t
′
. The first order condition can be written as
∂E(π)
∂t
= −0.5(pL − cL)Q+ 0.5
t+ t
′ − t
(t+ t′)2
DHHpH − 0.5QcH − 0.5(Q−
t+ t
′ − t
(t+ t′)2
DHH )I
− 0.5(pL − cL)Q+ 0.5
t+ t
′ − t
(t+ t′)2
DLHpH − 0.5QcH − 0.5(Q−
t+ t
′ − t
(t+ t′)2
DLH)I
= −(pL − cL)Q− cHQ− IQ+ 0.5
t
′
(t+ t′)2
DHHpH + 0.5
t
′
(t+ t′)2
DHHI
+ 0.5
t
′
(t+ t′)2
DLHpH + 0.5
t
′
(t+ t′)2
DLHI.
= −(pL − cL)Q−QcH − IQ+
1
8t
DHHpH +
1
8t
DHHI +
1
8t
DLHpH +
1
8t
DLHI
= −(pL − cL)Q−QcH − IQ+
1
8t
DH(1 + ∆L)pH +
1
8t
DH(1 + ∆L)I
+
1
8t
DH(1−∆L)pH +
1
8t
DH(1−∆L)I
(2.25)
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The share which the duopolist allocates for the high-quality good is represented as
t =
pH + I
4(cH + I + pL − cL)
DH
Q
(2.26)
The inventory in duopoly case in the high condition is represented as
InventoryDuopoly
H
= 2tQ−DHH
=
pH + I
2(cH + I + pL − cL)
DH −DH(1 + ∆L).
(2.27)
Equation 2.27 needs to be positive.
The inventory for the duopoly case for the low condition is
InventoryDuopoly
L
= 2tQ−DLH
=
pH + I
2(cH + I + pL − cL)
DH −DH(1−∆L)
(2.28)
The average inventory in the duopoly case is
InventoryDuopoly =
1
2
(2tQ−DHH + 2tQ−DLH)
=
pH + I
2(cH + I + pL − cL)
DH −DH
(2.29)
2.2.4 Summary and Discussion
Proposition 1. If 2wLcL−wHcH + cH + I < 0, when the demand uncertainty
is relatively small, then the inventory is larger in the duopoly market than in the
monopoly market.
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Proof.
InventoryMonopoly − InventoryDuopoly = ∆LDH −
pH + I
2(cH + I + pL − cL)
DH +DH
= ∆LDH + [1−
pH + I
2(cH + I + pL − cL)
]DH
= ∆LDH +
2wLcL − wHcH + cH + I
2(cH + I + pL − cL)
DH .
(2.30)
Recall that since Equation 2.27 is positive, and also 2(cH + I + pL − cL) > 0, when
2wLcL − wHcH + cH + I < 0, we have 2wLcL−wHcH+cH+I2(cH+I+pL−cL) < 0, meaning that the
inventory is larger when there is regional competition than in the monopoly market.
Our empirical analysis is based on this proposition.
Proposition 2. ∂Inventory
Duopoly
∂I
< 0 for all I. When in the duopoly market,
the negative consequences for not following the requirements provide an incentive for
the managers to reduce their inventories.
Proof.
∂InventoryDuopoly
∂I
=
1
4
2(cH + I + pL − cL)− 2(pH + I)
(cH + I + pL − cL)2
DH
=
1
4
2(cH + pL − cL − pH)
(cH + I + pL − cL)2
DH
=
1
2
(wLcL − wHcL)
(cH + I + pL − cL)2
DH
(2.31)
Recall that wLcL < wHcH ,
∂InventoryDuopoly
∂I
< 0 is always true.
Proposition 2 provides the key support for the primary argument of this study.
The property of mission-oriented contracts for managers in state-owned enterprises
leads to a lower proportion of high-quality goods. As the negative consequences
increase, the ratio that managers allocate for high-quality goods decreases. However,
as we do not have the measure of these consequences, we cannot use the current data
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to test this proposition.
2.3 Data Description
2.3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The empirical tests are based on the dataset from the STMA, which includes
the monthly panel inventory database from the year 2005 to the year 2011. The total
number of observations is 1,787 at the province-month level.
We divided our sample into two groups for each quality of cigarette stud-
ied here: provinces with a single-firm structure before the reform (Group One) and
provinces with multiple firms before the merger (Group Two). The primary variables
in this study are the natural logarithm of inventories for cigarettes, and for high-
quality cigarettes, medium quality cigarettes and low-quality cigarettes respectively.1
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables of this study for reor-
ganized provinces and merged provinces separately before and after the reform in the
tobacco industry. The number of observations for Group One, which is the reorga-
nized group, before the reform is 211 and after the reform, 700, while for Group Two,
which is the merger group, before the reform the number of observations is 312 and
after the merger 564. Figure 2.1 shows the mean of inventory in the calendar month.
In each panel, we separate the graphs into two parts. The left side of each panel
represents the mean of inventory for the reorganized group, while the right represents
the mean of inventory for the merged group. Panel (a), (b), and (c) show the indi-
vidual mean of inventory for high-quality cigarettes, medium-quality cigarettes, and
low-quality cigarettes, respectively. As these graphs show, the market with multiple
1We use log(inventory + 1) to calculate log inventory
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firms before the consolidation has a higher inventory than the market with a single
firm. Furthermore, except for the inventory for low-quality cigarettes, both groups
exhibit a horizontal trend, the high-quality and medium-quality panels all showing
an increasing trend.
We take the quotas for different provinces into consideration because, under
the quantity regulation market, the quotas vary across provinces exogenously; it is a
significant effect of the quantity of inventory. On the other hand, as managers need to
meet their production quotas mandated by the STMA, we treat the total production
quantity as the quota for each province. Table 2.2 displays the comparison of the log
of production and the log of inventory for each group before and after the reform.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.2 shows the mean of the log of the sum of inventory, while Panel
(b) presents the mean of the log of production by calendar month. There are two
features seen in the total quota. First, the total inventory and the total quota show an
increasing trend for both groups. Second, both the mean of inventory and the mean
of quotas are double in the merged provinces, which included multiple manufacturers
before the reform.
2.3.2 Graph Evidences
Figures 2.3 presents the stylized facts from the basic inventory regressions
that motivated this research. We divided our sample into two groups for each quality
cigarette: provinces with a single-firm before the reform (Group One) and provinces
with multiple-firms before the merger (Group Two); the red vertical dashed line
represents to, the time of the reorganization.
By running the regression of the equation below:
ln(Yit) = β0 + β1 ∗ ln(Q) + γ ∗Xit + θm + θr + εit, (2.32)
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where i indexes the province and t indexes the month. Yit is the dependent variable
expressed by the total inventory, the high-quality cigarette inventory, the medium-
quality cigarette inventory, the low-quality cigarette inventory. ln(Q) is the natural
logarithm of the quotas; and the vector Xit contains a set of province-level control
variables that include the natural logarithm of the population, the unemployment
rate, the natural logarithm of personal income per capita, and the natural logarithm
of GDP.
Then we plot the residual of the log of inventory for high-quality cigarettes,
medium-quality cigarettes, low-quality cigarettes, and the log of the sum of the in-
ventory. A pattern emerges: for the reorganized group, the market structure does not
change since it always has a single firm in the market. The mean of the residuals of
high-quality cigarettes and medium-quality cigarettes, and the sum are constant after
the reorganization, while the residuals of the log of low-quality cigarettes decrease dra-
matically. However, for the group where the market structure changed from multiple
firms to a single firm, the log of inventory of all the quality cigarettes moves right after
the merger event happened. The high-quality cigarettes, medium-quality cigarettes,
and the sum of inventory exhibit decreasing trends, while the low-quality cigarettes
exhibit the opposite tendency after the merger. These results suggest that the market
structure affects the managers’ incentives. Table 4 shows summary statistics of the
residuals.
2.4 Empirical Model
This section presents the empirical method used in this study, which aims to
examine the predictions from the theoretical model presented above. Because the pe-
riods for our data include both the pre- and the post-time frames, we have two groups,
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the control group and the treatment group: Group One with a single firm before the
reform as the control group and Group Two, the treatment group with multiple-firms
before the merger. The difference-in-difference strategy can be used to estimate the
effect of the reform on inventory outcomes. The timing of the reform in the Chi-
nese cigarette industry, which was decided by STMA, is exogenous, and the merger
mandates that multiple firms in the same province merge into one manufacturer. Be-
cause the decision to merge is exogenous, the difference-in-difference estimate of the
reform is the causal treatment effect. We specify the following difference-in-difference
estimator for the merger:
ln(Yit) = β0 + β1 ∗ dMit + β2 ∗ dGit + β3 ∗ dMit ∗ dGit + β4 ∗ dGit ∗ dMit
+ γ1 ∗ ln(Q) + γ2 ∗Xit + θm + θr + εit,
(2.33)
where ln(Yit) is our outcome variable and Yit represents the quantity of inventory
for a certain quality level: the inventory of high-quality cigarettes, the inventory of
medium-quality cigarettes, the inventory of low-quality cigarettes, and the sum of
the inventory at month t in province i. The treatment dummy variable Mit = 1 if
province i has reorganized or merged; Mit = 0 if it is before the reform. The group
dummy Git = 0 if the province i is in the reorganized group which had a single firm
before the reconstruction, and Git = 1 if province i is in the merged group which
had multiple firms before the merger. The vector Xit contains a set of province-level
control variables. Monthly fixed effects and regional fixed effects are included here,
denoted by θm and θr, respectively. The monthly and region fixed effects explain the
influences that are common in a month and for a certain area that are not captured
by the province-level control variables Xit. We estimate Equation 2.33 using monthly
data from the year 2005 to the year 2011.
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2.5 Difference-in-Difference Results
In this section, we report the results of the differences-in-differences estimates
for total inventory and the inventory for high-quality cigarettes, medium-quality
cigarettes, and low-quality cigarettes based on estimates from Equation 2.33. The
results for each outcome variable are presented in Table 2.4. All estimates include
controls for monthly and regional fixed effects. The Merge ∗ GroupDummy is sig-
nificant for all three quality levels of cigarettes, while the coefficients for high-quality
cigarettes and medium-quality cigarettes are negative, and for low-quality cigarettes,
it is positive. The coefficient of the total inventory is not significant. Estimates
demonstrate that compared with the single firm reorganized group, when multiple
firms merged into one sole manufacturer, the inventory of high-quality cigarettes and
medium-quality cigarettes decreases significantly, while the inventory of low-quality
cigarettes increases. These results are consistent with the prediction from our theo-
retical model.
2.6 Conclusion
This study began with a theoretical model that includes the demand uncer-
tainty for both the monopoly and duopoly market structures. The managers’ incentive
is assumed to be to maximize their expected profits from high state and low state in
the face of demand uncertainty. In addition, they must reduce their inventory to avoid
negative consequences. The manufacturers in a monopoly situation have a smaller
inventory than those with regional competition. However, the negative consequences
cause the managers in the latter situation to reduce their inventories.
This paper uses a difference-in-difference method to examine the effects of the
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mandated consolidation on inventory. The empirical results are consistent with our
theoretical predictions. The evidence suggests, when in a monopoly market and the
manager faces only demand uncertainty, the inventory for high-quality cigarettes and
medium-quality cigarettes decreased, while the inventory for low-quality cigarettes in-
creased. The empirical results for high-quality cigarettes and medium-quality cigarettes
are consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model.
There are several opportunities for further development of our theoretical
model. First, we assume that managers are all risk neutral. However, in the real
world, managers have different risk preferences; we could use a non-linear utility
function instead of profit function to capture the managers’ risk preferences. Second,
as before the consolidation provinces included more than two manufacturers in the
region, we could extend the model to include more than two managers in the future.
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Figure 2.1: Mean of Inventory by Calendar Month
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Figure 2.2: Mean of ln(Inventory) and ln(Production) by Calendar Month
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(d) residual for inventory
Figure 2.3: inventory residual mean
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Inventory
ln(Inventory) Mean Std.Dev N Max Min
Before: Single Firm
High 1.042 0.913 211 3.083 0
Medium 1.419 0.926 211 3.394 0
Low 2.640 0.874 211 4.220 0.513
All 3.030 0.842 211 4.680 0.688
After: Single Firm
High 1.655 1.138 700 4.603 0
Medium 2.030 1.376 700 5.469 0
Low 2.455 1.445 700 4.585 0
All 3.274 1.347 700 5.878 0.010
Before: Multiple Firms
High 2.019 0.869 312 4.446 0.501
Medium 2.335 0.824 312 4.473 0.967
Low 3.275 0.638 312 4.696 1.411
All 3.812 0.651 312 5.459 2.640
After: Single Firm
High 2.041 0.894 564 4.055 0.166
Medium 2.391 0.849 564 4.883 0.166
Low 3.334 0.598 564 4.874 1.585
3.902 0.572 564 5.618 2.721
Note:
For the ln(Inventory), I sum the inventory for high-quality cigarettes,
medium-quality cigarettes, and low-quality cigarettes up first, then take the
natural logarithm of the sum of inventory .
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Log of Quotas
ln(Quotas) Mean Std.Dev N Max Min
Before: Single Firm
3.263 0.899 211 5.393 1.297
After: Single Firm
3.417 1.418 700 6.049 0.01
Before: Multiple Firms
4.253 0.631 312 5.924 3.036
After: Single Firm
4.314 0.569 564 6.007 2.595
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Main Variables Residual
ln(Inventory) Mean Std.Dev N Max Min
Reconstructed: Before
High -0.064 0.477 211 1.529 -1.210
Medium -0.061 0.570 211 1.538 -1.403
Low 0.198 0.440 211 1.281 -0.999
All 0.029 0.386 211 1.309 -1.698
Reconstructed: After
High 0.027 0.666 700 1.526 -2.077
Medium 0.004 0.628 700 1.711 -2.716
Low -0.051 0.505 700 1.421 -1.785
All 0.001 0.254 700 0.926 -0.837
Merged: Before
High 0.097 0.548 312 1.342 -1.224
Medium 0.108 0.588 312 1.518 -0.824
Low -0.066 0.298 312 0.507 -1.125
All 0.006 0.219 312 0.436 -0.818
Merged:After
High -0.063 0.572 564 1.289 -1.684
Medium -0.042 0.556 564 1.314 -1.085
Low 0.026 0.294 564 0.861 -1.135
All -0.015 0.214 564 0.639 -0.883
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Table 2.4: Difference-in-Difference Regression Results
ln(inventory)
High Medium Low Total
ln(Q) 0.486*** 0.866*** 0.600*** 0.792***
(0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0154) (0.00968)
Merger Dummy 0.0130 -0.0241 -0.283*** -0.0259
(0.0630) (0.0632) (0.0432) (0.0271)
Group Dummy 0.123 0.150** -0.324*** -0.0801**
(0.0751) (0.0753) (0.0515) (0.0323)
Merger*Group Dummy -0.269*** -0.113* 0.387*** 0.0360
(0.0731) (0.0733) (0.0501) (0.0314)
ln(population) 0.122 -1.169*** 1.221*** 0.477***
(0.113) (0.113) (0.0774) (0.0485)
unemployment rate 0.169*** 0.165*** 0.228*** 0. 149***
(0.0457) (0.0459) (0.0313) (0.0197)
ln(income) 2.008*** -0.813*** 0.742*** 0.813***
(0.179) (0.180) (0.123) (0.0770)
ln(GDP) -0.0332 0.992*** -0.962*** -0.371***
(0.0849) (0.0851) (0.0582) (0.0365)
constant -21.53*** 6.826*** -9.189*** -9.190***
(1.181) (1.823) (1.246) (0.781)
N 1787 1787 1787 1787
adj. R-sq 0.658 0.707 0.861 0.936
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:
Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are de-
noted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Chapter 3
The Welfare Analysis of the Effect
of Horizontal Mergers
3.1 Consumers Welfare Analysis
Recall the theoretical model in Chapter One, which models the two effects of
the reorganization. First, Type A and Type B consumers have more choices as they
can buy high-quality cigarettes with their desired attributes after the merger. In a
duopoly market, Type B consumers in Firm One’s market and Type A consumers
in Firm Two’s market will buy the low-quality cigarettes instead of the high-quality
cigarettes because of their strong preferences for a particular attribute. After the
mandated consolation by the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA), the
openness of the markets makes the consumers can buy the cigarettes with their desired
attribute; thus, the welfare of these types of consumers improves because of the
reform. Second, because of the change in the market structure, consumers who can
buy cigarettes with their preferred quality level increases; thus, the total consumption
of cigarettes increases. Since the mandated reorganization does not change the price
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mechanism and profit margins, the prices charged to the consumers do not change,
meaning the welfare of Type C consumers remains the same. Based on this analysis,
the welfare of all consumers increases as a result of the consolidation.
3.2 Producers Welfare Analysis
Based on the results from the theoretical model and the empirical model in
Chapter Two, the inventory for high-quality cigarettes and medium-quality cigarettes
decreases, while the inventory for low-quality cigarettes increases. As cigarettes are
products with a fairly short expiration date, much of their inventory may have to be
discarded. We measure the inventory in terms of dollars to analyze the welfare of the
producers.
In my data, the mean of the allocation prices for low-quality cigarettes is 15
RMB and for medium-quality cigarettes, 40 RMB, while the mean for high-quality
cigarettes is 65 RMB. 1 To estimate the dollar value of the inventory change compared
with the counterfactual group without the change in market, we use the equation
below
Yit = β0 + β1 ∗ dMit + β2 ∗ dGit + β3 ∗ dMit ∗ dGit + β4 ∗ dGit ∗ dMit
+ γ1 ∗ ln(Q) + γ2 ∗Xit + θm + θr + εit,
(3.1)
where Yit represents the sum of the inventory at month t in province i in dollars.
2 The treatment dummy variable Mit captures whether the reorganization occurred
or not. Git is the dummy variable for the types of reorganization: Git = 0 for our
1Recall: In Table 1.1 in Chapter One, I report the cigarette classification from high to low based
on the allocation prices of the STMA standardization.
2To calculate the dollar amount of the total inventory, we use Yit = 65 ∗ InventoryHighit + 40 ∗
InventoryMediumit + 15 ∗ InventoryLowit . The summary statistics for the inventory in dollar is shown
in Appendix Table 1.
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control group, while Git = 1 for the treatment group. Province-level control variables,
monthly fixed effects and regional fixed effects are included in Equation 3.1. The
results for the inventory in dollars are shown in Table 3.1. The negative coefficient
of the term Merger ∗GroupDummy indicates that compared with the control group
without the change in market structure, the dollar value of the inventory decreases
after the mandated consolidation occurred. The welfare of the producers increases
because of the lower dollar value of the inventory after the change in the market
structure.
3.3 Grasp the Large
The reform in the state-owned sector in the late 1990s was meant to grasp
the large state-owned enterprises. After the reform, the reorganized large industrial
conglomerates are still under the control of the central government. The centralization
reform led by the state occurred not only in the cigarette industry but also in other
key sectors, such as the steel, automotive, and coal industry. However, the regulation
of both price and quantity quotas makes the cigarette industry unique, where the
managers can choose only quota-allocation for different quality cigarettes as their
competition strategy, meaning their welfare depends only on the quantity of cigarettes
as regulated by the quota. Therefore, it is easier to identify the welfare change due
to the reform using the cigarette industry. In a non-regulated market, moving from a
duopoly to a monopoly will cause a deadweight loss and decrease consumer welfare.
However, as China’s cigarette market is highly regulated, the welfare increases because
of the reduction in market players.
There is a contrasting type of reform in the state-owned sector as we discussed
above, i.e., the telecommunication industry exhibits as the decentralization process.
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The state reorganized the industry into three large enterprises. Both types of reform
are under state controlled regulation strategies; it would be interesting to discover
the difference in the welfare change between these two types of reform in the future.
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Table 3.1: Difference-in-Difference Regression Results
Dollar Value of Inventory
ln(Q) 1044.2***
(38.87)
Merger Dummy -263.4**
(108.7)
Group Dummy 224.1*
(129.6)
Merger*Group Dummy -545.9***
(126.1)
ln(population) -481.4**
(194.9)
Unemployment Rate 526.4***
(78.90)
ln(income) 914.5***
(309.3)
ln(GDP) 380.9***
(146.5)
constant -13029.8***
(3137.0)
N 1787
adj. R-sq 0.603
Month FE Yes
Region FE Yes
Note:
Coefficient estimates that are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are de-
noted with ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Appendices
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(d) inventory
Figure 1: Mean of Inventory
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(a) residual for high-quality good inventory
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(b) residual for medium-quality good inven-
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(c) residual for low-quality good inventory
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(d) residual for inventory
Figure 2: inventory residual
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(a) residual for high-quality good inventory
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(c) residual for low-quality good inventory
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(d) residual for inventory
Figure 3: inventory residual median
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Dollar Values of Inventory
Inventory (Dollar) Mean Std.Dev N Max Min
Reconstructed: Before
High 217.8763 279.656 211 1353.3 0
Medium 208.436 232.952 211 1150.8 0
Low 279.6782 232.3037 211 1005.3 10.05
All 705.9905 625.3967 211 3181.4 22.85
Reconstructed: After
High 585.0604 785.0695 700 6240.7 0
Medium 710.6686 1149.626 700 9444.4 0
Low 351.5919 373.0515 700 1454.55 0
All 1647.321 1926.839 700 14721.4 0.65
Merged: Before
High 674.5042 817.0331 312 5480.15 42.24
Medium 611.2846 830.561 312 3466.4 65.2
Low 474.4072 340.3968 312 1628.1 46.5
All 1760.196 1836.963 312 9782.2 301.8
Merged:After
High 664.988 639.4327 564 3683.55 11.7
Medium 608.9709 730.088 564 5241.6 7.2
Low 487.2125 310.6858 564 1947.45 58.2
All 1761.171 1378.33 564 8935.8 341.55
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